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Trouble for Private Enforcement of the Sherman Act: 
Twombly, Pleading Standards, and the Oligopoly 
Problem 
Lee Goldman 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Courts and commentators have long struggled with the proper 
treatment of parallel conduct by competitors in oligopoly markets.1 
In such markets it is possible to achieve supra-competitive pricing 
through recognized interdependence, rather than agreement.2 
Although interdependent pricing results in the same harm to 
competitors as an agreement to fix prices, it is clear that the latter is 
per se illegal and the former, lacking a viable remedy, is legal.3 
However, courts have disagreed about what is sufficient evidence of 
agreement, as opposed to mere interdependence, to submit an 
oligopoly pricing4 case to a jury.5 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,6 
the Supreme Court recently addressed the antecedent question of 
what are sufficient allegations of agreement to survive a motion to 
dismiss a Sherman Act § 1 claim7 in an oligopoly market. 
 
  Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy, J.D. Stanford University 1979. 
 1. See infra notes 5, 142–65 and accompanying text. An oligopoly market is one in 
which there are only a few sellers. Common examples are the baby food, cereal, tire, and airline 
industries. 
 2. Supra-competitive pricing is pricing above the level that would be expected in a 
competitive market. Interdependence can occur in an industry with sufficiently few competitors 
so that there is a shared recognition that non-competitive behavior will be met with 
reciprocity, rather than active competition. For a greater discussion of interdependence and the 
“oligopoly problem,” see infra notes 142–65 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 148, 156–65 and accompanying text. 
 4. “Oligopoly pricing,” as used in this Article, refers to an oligopoly market in which 
there is parallel pricing at supra-competitive levels. 
 5. See Nickolai G. Levin, Nomos and Narrative of Matsushita, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1627 (2005). Compare Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028 (8th 
Cir. 2000) with In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
 6. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). Section 1 declares illegal “[e]very contract, combination . . . 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.” Id. 
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The Court concluded that simple allegations of parallel conduct 
with conclusory assertions of agreement could not survive a motion 
to dismiss.8 Nonetheless, the opinion contained little clear guidance 
as to what would be sufficient, other than indicating that the claim 
alleged must be “plausible.”9 The decision’s effect on oligopoly 
pricing cases in particular was (and remains) uncertain because the 
case involved non-price parallel conduct that the Court found could 
not plausibly be the result of agreement.10 
The Court’s discussion of general pleading standards also 
generated great confusion.11 The opinion contained many seemingly 
conflicting statements12 and its “retirement”13 of the venerable 
language from Conley v. Gibson,14 the grandfather of “notice 
pleading,” that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff can prove 
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief,”15 arguably suggested an intent to dramatically change 
pleading practice. 
Twombly is a confusing opinion replete with inconsistent 
statements. Although it is impossible to discuss the opinion without 
being critical of its lack of clarity, this Article is not merely a critique 
of the Court’s decision. Rather, through a review of the decisions of 
lower courts in the first six months following Twombly, it analyzes 
the consequences of the Court’s opinion and seeks to resolve some 
of the confusion that Twombly created. The Article demonstrates that 
 
 8. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966. 
 9. See infra note 77. 
 10. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1971–73. In contrast, oligopoly pricing is “plausibly” the 
result of agreement. 
 11. See, e.g., id. at 1988 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 
181, 188 n.7 (4th Cir. 2007); Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 541 (6th Cir. 
2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. June 16, 2008) (No. 07-1015); Iqbal v. Hasty, 
490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008); 
IFAST, Ltd. v. Alliance for Telecomms. Indus. Solutions, Inc., No. CCB-06-2088, 2007 WL 
3224582, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2007); Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. 121 (2007); Gordon Schnell, ‘Twombly’ Pleading 
Standard: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 238 N.Y. L.J. 4, col. 4 (Dec. 5, 2007); The Supreme 
Court, 2006 Term, Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 305, 310 (2007).  
 12. See infra notes 84–110 and accompanying text.  
 13. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969. 
 14. 355 U.S. 41 (1957), overruled in part by Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955. 
 15. Id. at 45–46. 
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Twombly has had virtually no effect in routine cases.16 In complex 
cases outside the antitrust arena, however, Twombly appears to have 
increased lower courts’ discretion to require additional factual 
allegations when necessary.17 In exercising that discretion, the lower 
courts have seemed to consider logical factors and to have exercised 
their discretion reasonably.18 Ironically, in most antitrust cases, the 
Supreme Court decision has had no effect on pleading requirements.  
In the specific context of oligopoly pricing cases, however, the 
Twombly decision appears to have had a great and regrettable effect. 
Lower courts have made private suits alleging price fixing in 
oligopoly markets near impossible to pursue absent a prior 
government suit.19 It is unclear if this is the result the Twombly Court 
intended or the consequence of several flaws in the lower courts’ 
decisions that are detailed below.20 In either case, blame falls on the 
Supreme Court as any lower court errors result from the Twombly 
Court’s failure to provide consistent reasoning and clear guidance. 
Part II describes Twombly. Part III addresses the ambiguities 
contained in the Court’s opinion and the effect the case has had on 
pleading practice in the lower courts. Special attention is given to the 
lower courts’ treatment of oligopoly pricing cases, as those are the 
cases in which Twombly has seemed to have the greatest effect. The 
Article concludes that if private enforcement of price fixing violations 
is to remain viable, these lower courts’ interpretations of Twombly 
must be corrected. 
II. BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V. TWOMBLY 
A. Background 
For many years, American Telephone & Telegraph Company 
(“AT&T”) monopolized the market for telephone service in the 
United States. In 1984, following a government suit, a consent 
decree established “regional service monopolies . . . ([called] 
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (“ILECs”)),21 and a separate 
 
 16. See infra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 112–13, 119 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 119–31 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 183–215, 284–90 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 216–83 and accompanying text. 
 21. The ILECs were alternatively called “Baby Bells” or “Regional Bell Operating 
Companies.” The original Baby Bells were Ameritech (bought by SBC in 1999), Bell Atlantic 
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competitive market for long-distance service from which the ILECs 
were excluded.”22 The regional service providers maintained their 
government-approved monopolies until Congress enacted the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.23 To encourage competition in 
both local and long distance telephone service, that Act permitted 
the ILECs to enter the long-distance market, but simultaneously 
imposed obligations on the ILECs designed to facilitate entry by 
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (“CLECs”) into the regional 
local service markets.24 Specifically, the ILECs were required to 
provide CLECs “with access to the ILECs’ network elements for 
‘just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory’ rates,” and to offer 
“telecommunications services at wholesale rates for resale to 
subscribers.”25 
B. The Complaint 
In Twombly, the plaintiffs, on behalf of a “putative class . . . of  
all ‘subscribers of local telephone and/or high speed internet services 
. . . from February 8, 1996 to present,’”26 filed claims asserting 
violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act.27 They alleged that four ILECs, 
controlling more than ninety percent of the local telephone services 
in the continental United States, conspired to prevent competitive 
entry into their local markets.28 The plaintiffs alleged that the ILECs: 
(1) resisted “CLECs’ attempts to compete” by “making unfair 
[access] agreements . . . providing inferior connections . . . 
overcharging, and billing in ways designed to sabotage the CLECs’ 
 
(acquired GTE in 2000 and became Verizon), BellSouth (bought by AT&T Inc. in 2006), 
NYNEX (bought by Bell Atlantic in 1996), Pacific Telesis (bought by SBC in 1997), 
Southwestern Bell (changed its name to SBC in 1995; acquired AT&T Corp. in 2005 and 
changed its name to AT&T Inc.), and US West (bought by Qwest in 2000). Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1961 (2007). 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. The Telecommunications Act is found at Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56 
(1996). 
 24. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1961.  
 25. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 
1955 (2007) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (2000)).  
 26. 127 S. Ct. at 1962 (quoting Complaint ¶ 53). 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 28. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1962 n.1. The four named defendants were BellSouth 
Corporation, Qwest Communications International, Inc., SBC Communications, Inc., and 
Verizon Communications, Inc. Id.  
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relations with their own customers” and (2) “refrain[ed] from 
competing against one another” despite ‘“attractive business 
opportunit[ies]’ in contiguous markets where they possessed 
‘substantial competitive advantages.’”29 The plaintiffs sought to have 
the court infer agreement on the first claim based on the ILECs’ 
parallel conduct and “compelling common motiv[e]” to exclude the 
CLECs.30 The plaintiffs reasoned that “‘[h]ad any one [ILEC] not 
sought to prevent CLECs . . . from competing effectively . . . , the 
resulting greater competitive inroads into that [ILEC’s] territory 
would have revealed the degree to which competitive entry by 
CLECs would have been successful in other territories.’”31 The 
conclusion that the defendants conspired to refrain from competing 
against one another was based on the assumption that such conduct 
was contrary to each defendant’s self-interest absent agreement, that 
is, that the defendants were forgoing a profitable market. In support 
of that assumption, the plaintiffs cited a statement by Richard 
Notebaert, the CEO of one of the defendants, that “competing in 
the territory of another ILEC ‘might be a good way to turn a quick 
dollar but that doesn’t make it right.’”32 
C. The Lower Court Decisions 
The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ amended complaint for 
failure to state a claim.33 The court concluded that, stripped of its 
conclusory allegations of conspiracy, plaintiffs’ complaint merely 
alleged consciously parallel conduct by the ILECs.34 The court cited 
Supreme Court precedent establishing that consciously parallel 
conduct alone is not enough to prove conspiracy.35 Because parallel 
action is to be expected in any market in which competitors have 
similar information and costs, the Court reasoned that certain so-
called “plus factors” must be alleged to distinguish independent 
 
 29. Id. at 1962 (quoting Complaint, ¶¶ 40–41).  
 30. Id. (quoting Complaint, ¶ 50). 
 31. Id. (quoting Complaint, ¶¶ 40–41).  
 32. Id. (quoting Complaint, ¶¶ 40–41).  
 33. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d, 425 
F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). 
 34. Id. at 179–81. 
 35. Id. at 179. 
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(legal) from collusive (illegal) conduct.36 The Court found the 
complaint failed to allege any such plus factors. It stated that an 
inference of agreement to thwart the CLECs was inappropriate as 
each individual defendant would independently be motivated to 
engage in the conduct alleged37 and plaintiffs’ allegations that the 
ILECs did everything in their power to make the CLECs 
unprofitable provided an explanation as to why the ILECs 
independently would choose not to compete as a CLEC in a 
neighboring ILEC’s territory.38 
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded,39 finding that the 
district court applied the wrong legal standard.40 Although 
acknowledging “a bare bones statement of conspiracy . . . under the 
antitrust laws without any supporting facts permits dismissal,”41 the 
court emphasized that the federal rules do not impose a heightened 
pleading standard for antitrust cases.42 Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8, all that is required is fair notice so that the adverse 
party can “answer and prepare for trial.”43 The court held that in an 
antitrust action, any claim of conspiracy must be “plausible,” but at 
the pleading stage, did not have to be supported by “plus factors.”44 
In order for allegations of parallel anticompetitive conduct to fail to 
support a plausible conspiracy claim, “a court would have to 
conclude that there is no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was the product 
of collusion rather than coincidence.”45 The court conceded that its 
 
 36. Id. at 179–81. The court identified the two most significant plus factors as 
“evidence that the parallel behavior would have been against individual defendants’ economic 
interests absent an agreement, or that defendants possessed a strong common motive to 
conspire.” Id. at 179 (citing Apex Oil v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253–54 (2d Cir. 1987)).  
 37. Id. at 183–84. 
 38. Id. at 185–88. 
 39. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 
1955 (2007).  
 40. Id. at 106. 
 41. Id. at 109 (citing Heart Disease Research Found. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 
98, 100 (2d Cir. 1972)).  
 42. Id. at 108–09. 
 43. Id. at 116. 
 44. Id. at 114. The court nonetheless found that the plaintiffs appeared to be able to 
plead plus factors. The court noted that the plaintiffs alleged motive, that defendants conduct 
was contrary to their self-interest absent agreement and that defendants had frequent 
opportunities to meet and organize the alleged conspiracy. Id. at 118. 
 45. Id. at 114. 
GOLDMAN.FIN 10/20/2008 12:33 PM 
1057] Trouble for Private Enforcement of the Sherman Act 
 1063 
decision, by more often imposing the “colossal expense of 
undergoing discovery” on antitrust defendants, might result in “a 
burden on the courts and a deleterious effect on the manner in 
which and efficiency with which business is conducted.”46 However, 
the court reasoned that if the balance to be struck between the 
federal courts’ liberal pleading rules and the realities of litigation 
needs recalibration, it is for Congress or the Supreme Court to make 
the adjustment.47 
D. The Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme Court, seemingly accepting the Second Circuit’s 
invitation, granted certiorari.48 Justice Souter, writing for the Court, 
framed the issue narrowly as “whether a § 1 complaint can survive a 
motion to dismiss when it alleges . . . parallel conduct unfavorable to 
competition, absent some factual context suggesting agreement, as 
distinct from identical, independent action.”49 The Court, finding 
such a complaint must be dismissed, reversed the Court of Appeals.50 
In a 7–2 decision, Justice Souter, writing for the Court, began 
his analysis with the basic principle that “conscious parallelism,” 
without more, cannot establish agreement for purposes of § 1.51 
Such behavior, although consistent with conspiracy, is equally “in 
line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy 
unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.”52 The 
concern with “false positives”53 is why the Court previously required 
a plaintiff to present conspiracy evidence that “tend[s] to rule out 
the possibility that the defendants were acting independently” to 
survive a summary judgment motion.54 
 
 46. Id. at 117. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 548 U.S. 903 (2006). 
 49. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1961 (2007). 
 50. Id. at 1963 
 51. Id. at 1964. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. False positives in § 1 lawsuits are cases where conspiracy is found when no 
agreement actually was present. The problems associated with false positives are discussed in 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS ANTITRUST CASES: SEPARATING FACT FROM FANTASY 3–4 (2006).  
 54. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)). 
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Before addressing the antecedent question of what must be 
pleaded in an antitrust conspiracy case to survive a motion to dismiss, 
Justice Souter reviewed general standards for motions under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).55 In so doing, Justice Souter 
provided lower courts with citation support regardless of whether 
those courts grant or deny a motion to dismiss.56 The Court said that 
a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations and 
emphasized that heightened pleading standards are appropriate only 
under Federal Rule 9, which is limited to allegations of fraud, 
mistake, conditions of mind, or special damages,57 and not under 
Federal Rule 8.58 On the other hand, the Court said plaintiff’s 
obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions” and must 
contain enough factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level.”59 
Applying these general standards to the § 1 claim before the 
Court, Justice Souter concluded that the plaintiff must allege 
“enough factual matter (taken as true)” to provide “plausible 
grounds to infer an agreement.”60 Justice Souter explained that  
the “plausibility” standard “does not impose a probability 
requirement . . . it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal 
agreement.”61 A “complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy 
judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable,” and recovery is 
unlikely.62 However, the Court specifically rejected the Conley 
Court’s formulation,63 relied upon by the Second Circuit, that a 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim “unless 
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”64 That 
standard, the Court suggested, is literally satisfied by the most 
 
 55. Id. at 1964–65. 
 56. See infra note 116. 
 57. FED. R. CIV. P. 9. 
 58. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964, 1973 n.14. 
 59. Id. at 1965. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1969. 
 64. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), overruled in part by Twombly, 127 
S. Ct. 1955. 
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conclusory allegations and ignores the realities of modern antitrust 
litigation.65 Instead, the Court said, “‘a district court must retain the 
power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a 
potentially massive factual controversy to proceed.’”66 The Court 
maintained that requiring “allegations plausibly suggesting (not 
merely consistent with) agreement reflects Rule 8(a)(2)’s threshold 
requirement that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to 
‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”67 
Applying the “plausibility” standard to the complaint, Justice 
Souter found the plaintiffs’ allegations deficient. The Court 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ stray allegations of agreement as mere “legal 
conclusions.”68 Rather, the Court read the complaint as relying on 
the allegations of parallel conduct.69 The Court thought the ILECs’ 
parallel actions to thwart the CLECs’ attempts to compete did not 
plausibly suggest agreement because each individual ILEC had 
powerful economic incentives to frustrate the CLECs, regardless of 
the actions of the other ILECs.70 There was no reason to infer that 
the defendants conspired among themselves “to do what was only 
natural [for them to do] anyway.”71 The Court also found that the 
allegations of a parallel refusal of ILECs to compete as CLECs in 
neighboring ILECs’ territory did not plausibly suggest conspiracy. 
Justice Souter suggested that “a natural explanation for the 
noncompetition alleged is that the former Government-sanctioned 
monopolists were sitting tight, expecting their neighbors to do the 
same.”72 Justice Souter reasoned that the ILECs “surely knew the 
adage about him who lives by the sword.”73 Moreover, the 
complaint’s allegations that CLECs faced nearly insurmountable 
 
 65. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966–67. As the Second Circuit explained, the colossal costs 
of discovery in antitrust cases may “lead defendants . . . to settle what would ultimately be 
shown to be meritless claims” and thereby encourage plaintiffs to bring other claims without 
merit. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 117 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1955 
(2007).  
 66. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983)). 
 67. Id. at 1966 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration in original). 
 68. Id. at 1970. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1971. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1972. 
 73. Id. 
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barriers to profitability, owing to the ILECs’ flagrant resistance to 
their obligations under the 1996 Act, belied the plaintiffs’ assertion 
that the ILECs were foregoing especially attractive business 
opportunities.74 Thus, the Court reasoned, even assuming that they 
had the finances to expand, ILECs logically would choose to invest 
in more lucrative markets.75 
III. INTERPRETING TWOMBLY 
Twombly clearly holds that an allegation of parallel conduct alone 
is not sufficient to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act.76 It 
also must be understood as requiring a claim to be plausible;77 
however, that plausibility requirement is a flexible test.78 Little else 
about the opinion is self-evident. This uncertainty has proven to be 
the opinion’s strength outside the antitrust area.79 However, the 
opinion’s ambiguities have led to problematic decisionmaking in 
antitrust cases involving oligopoly markets.80 
A. Non-Antitrust Cases 
Courts and commentators decried the Twombly opinion as 
creating substantial confusion.81 Indeed, it was not even clear if 
 
 74. Id. at 1972–73. Justice Souter found Qwest’s CEO’s statement to be taken out of 
context. Justice Souter believed the district court was entitled to take notice of the full 
contents of the published article referenced in the complaint. Id. at 1972 n.13. Later in the 
article quoted by the plaintiffs, CEO Notebaert said, “entering new markets as a CLEC would 
not be ‘a sustainable economic model’ because the CLEC pricing model is ‘just . . . nuts.’” Id. 
at 1972 (quoting Jon Van, Americtech Customers Off Limits: Notebaert, CHI. TRIB. Oct. 31, 
2002, Business Section, at 1). Another source in the complaint quoted Notebaert as saying 
that the regulatory environment was too unstable to “base a business plan” on the rights 
accorded CLECs under the Communications Act. Id. at 1972–73 (quoting Jon Van, 
Lawmakers Seek Probe of Bells: Do Firms Agree Not to Compete?, CHI. TRIB. Dec. 19, 2002, at 
2).  
 75. See id. at 1973. 
 76. Id. at 1961. 
 77. As the Second Circuit pointed out in Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 156 (2d Cir. 
2007), cert. granted, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008), the Twombly Court “used the 
word ‘plausibility’ or an adjectival or adverbial form of the word fifteen times (not counting 
quotations).” See also Brown v. Kerkhoff, 504 F. Supp. 2d 464, 522 (S.D. Iowa 2007) (“Aside 
from noting the repeated use of the root word ‘plausible,’ little can be synthesized from these 
pronouncements in terms of a concise, clear, and usable test.”). 
 78. See infra note 113. 
 79. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 80. See infra notes 183–283 and accompanying text.  
 81. See supra note 11. 
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Twombly applied outside the antitrust context.82 Courts also have 
questioned the decision’s scope.83 
Several signals support a broad reading of Twombly. First, 
Twombly expressly rejected the often-used Conley “no set of facts” 
formulation for determining when a complaint can be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim.84 Instead, the plaintiff was required to plead 
enough facts suggesting the “entitle[ment] to relief.”85 
Second, the opinion, although disavowing application of a 
heightened pleading standard,86 included much language suggesting 
that more than notice needs to be provided by the plaintiff’s 
complaint. The Court found that mere “labels and conclusions” 
were insufficient to state a claim.87 Rather, a plaintiff must allege 
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”88 
Rule 8(a)(2)’s “plain statement” must contain “enough heft” to 
show that the pleader is entitled to relief and the plaintiff is required 
to make factual allegations “plausibly suggesting (not merely 
consistent with)” unlawful activity.89 Any less, the Court said, fails to 
 
 82. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1988 (2007) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 541 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 
76 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. June 16, 2008) (No. 07-1015); IFAST, Ltd. v. Alliance for 
Telecomms. Ind. Solutions, Inc., No. CCB-06-2088, 2007 WL 3224582, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 
27, 2007). It is now clear that Twombly does apply outside the antitrust context. See, e.g., Fin. 
Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2007) (federal 
securities claim); Triad Consultants, Inc. v. Wiggins, No. 07-1007, 2007 WL 2733687, at *2 
(10th Cir. Sept. 17, 2007) (claim under Computer Fraud And Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030); 
Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007) (enforceability of non-compete 
covenant and counterclaims for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious 
interference and unfair competition); E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 
773, 777 (7th Cir. 2007) (Title VII retaliation action); Gregory v. Dillards, Inc., 494 F.3d 
694, 710 (8th Cir. 2007), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 05-3910, 2007 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 30544 (8th Cir. Sept. 20, 2007) (suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Missouri 
Human Rights Act); Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(securities fraud claim); Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008) (complaint alleging twenty-one causes of action, 
including statutory and constitutional tort claims). However, application of Twombly often 
does not affect the result in non-antitrust cases. See infra notes 114–16 and accompanying 
text.  
 83. Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 n.7 (4th Cir. 2007); Weisbarth, 
499 F.3d at 541 (quoting Iqbal, 490 F3d. at 157–58); Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 155. 
 84. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969. 
 85. Id. at 1964–65 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957)).  
 86. Id. at 1973–74 n.14. 
 87. Id. at 1965. 
 88. Id. at 1974. 
 89. Id. at 1966. 
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cross the line “between the factually neutral and the factually 
suggestive.”90 
Third, the Court emphasized the costs of discovery and its effects 
on settlement.91 The Court found that careful case management and 
the availability of summary judgment was not a sufficient remedy,92 
implicitly rejecting the view that “federal courts and litigants must 
rely on summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out 
unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later.”93 Finally, the Court’s 
introduction and application of its “plausibility standard” suggested 
that a complaint must do more than just state a claim.94 
On the other hand, there are several reasons to read Twombly 
narrowly. First, although the Court “retired” Conley’s “no set of 
facts” formulation, it cited Conley approvingly for the proposition 
that gave rise to “notice pleading”: Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a 
short and plain statement of the claim’ in order to ‘give the 
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 
which it rests.’”95 Moreover, the Court specified it was overruling 
the literal reading of Conley’s “no set of facts” standard.96 The Court 
correctly explained that even the most conclusory allegations would 
satisfy a literal application of that formulation.97 
Second, although the Court required more than just legal 
conclusions, it repeatedly indicated it was not imposing a heightened 
pleading standard98 and expressly approved the use of Form 9.99 
According to that form, a negligence claim is sufficient if it alleges 
that on an identified date on an identified road, the “defendant 
negligently drove a motor vehicle,” striking plaintiff.100 It is not 
necessary to state the basis upon which the claim of negligent driving 
 
 90. Id. at 1966 n.5. 
 91. Id. at 1967. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 
U.S. 163, 168–69 (1993). 
 94. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1959, 1970–74.  
 95. Id. at 1964 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 
 96. Id. at 1968–69. 
 97. Id. at 1968. For that matter, if the plaintiff filed a blank document, it could not be 
said that the plaintiff could prove “no set of facts” showing that he or she was entitled to relief.  
 98. Id. at 1973–74 n.14. 
 99. Id. at 1970 n.10. Form 9 became Form 11 in December of 2007.  
 100. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11. 
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rests. Facts explaining how the defendant was negligent are not 
required.101 
Third, the opinion contained much standard boilerplate 
supporting a denial of a motion to dismiss. It stated that a complaint 
“does not need detailed factual allegations;”102 ‘“Rule 12(b)(6) does 
not countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a 
complaint’s factual allegations;’”103 and “a well-pleaded complaint 
may proceed even if it appears ‘that a recovery is very remote and 
unlikely.’”104 
Fourth, the indications of a heightened standard for stating a 
claim discussed above could be read as limited to the antitrust 
context. The Court’s emphasis on the costs of antitrust discovery in 
particular suggests that it did not wish to encourage the use of 
motions to dismiss, as opposed to summary judgment, to eliminate 
non-meritorious claims in more routine litigation. Similarly, the use 
of a “plausibility standard” could be viewed as antitrust specific. 
Routine claims, such as most negligence actions, are almost always 
inherently plausible. Moreover, the Court has a prior history of 
considering the plausibility of antitrust claims,105 in part, because 
false positives106 can “chill the very conduct [active competition] the 
antitrust laws are designed to protect.”107 The Court also may have 
been less concerned with false negatives in private antitrust suits 
because government enforcement of the antitrust laws could remedy 
the worst violations. The Court’s narrow framing of the issue for 
decision108 also could support a reading that the decision primarily 
applies to antitrust litigation. 
 
 101.  See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1977; In re Holland, 374 B.R. 409, 439 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2007) (stating that the Court in Twombly took no notice of the lack of specific 
allegations of negligence, for example, driving too fast or running a stop sign). 
 102. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964. 
 103. Id. at 1965 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). 
 104. Id. (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).  
 105. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 593 
(1986) (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762–64 (1984)); Asahi 
Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner, J., 
sitting by designation). 
 106. A false positive is an improper finding of a violation. 
 107. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414 
(2004) (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594). 
 108. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1961 (“The question in this putative class action is whether a 
§ 1 complaint can survive a motion to dismiss when it alleges that major telecommunications 
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Finally, evidence that the Court meant Twombly to be read 
narrowly is found in Erickson v. Pardus,109 a case the Court issued 
just two weeks after Twombly. In Erickson the Court reversed a Court 
of Appeals decision affirming dismissal of a state inmate’s Eighth 
Amendment claim. The Court criticized the Court of Appeals, 
finding that the plaintiff’s complaint was too conclusory.110 Citing 
Twombly, the Court stated that “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the 
statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . 
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests’” and characterized the 
Court of Appeals decision as a “departure from the liberal pleading 
standards set forth by Rule 8(a)(2).”111 
The Court’s mixed signals, although easily criticized as 
confusing,112 may have been the opinion’s genius. By providing 
lower courts with citation support for granting or denying a motion 
to dismiss, the Court widened the trial courts’ discretion in deciding 
such motions. Rather than a single standard that inevitably would 
allow too many frivolous cases to proceed or terminate too many 
meritorious claims, the Court’s decision allows lower court judges, 
the persons in the best position to do so, to calibrate case-by-case the 
proper balance between pleading requirements and the costs of 
discovery. In short, rather than require literal application, the 
Court’s “plausibility test” is a flexible standard.113 
  
 
providers engaged in certain parallel conduct unfavorable to competition, absent some factual 
context suggesting agreement, as distinct from identical, independent action.”). 
 109. 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007). 
 110. Id. at 2200. 
 111. Id. Erickson involved a pro se complaint. Such complaints are held to a less stringent 
pleading standard than that applied to complaints filed by attorneys. See id.; McNeil v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982). 
Nonetheless, the Court appeared to view the Court of Appeals decision as a departure from 
normal pleading practice because it called the departure “even more pronounced” because the 
plaintiff was proceeding pro se. Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200. 
 112. See supra note 11. 
 113. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 
2931 (2008); accord Ryan v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., No. 1:06-CV-1770-JDT-TAB, 2007 
WL 2316474, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 8, 2007). 
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The Court’s marginal increase in discretion has not affected 
many cases. This is best illustrated graphically: 
DIAGRAM 1: Effect of Twombly in Non-Antitrust Cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Segment AB represents cases where the pleading alleges sufficient 
facts under Twombly. Segment CD corresponds to cases that either 
have alleged insufficient facts under traditional notice pleading or 
lack adequate legal support. Under both segments, Twombly does 
not affect the case result. Thus, the most common use of the 
Twombly is simply as part of the courts’ updated boilerplate on 
standards of review on motions to dismiss, with little change in the 
courts’ analysis.114 Other courts explicitly say there is no need to 
 
 114. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007); Grate 
v. Huffman, No. 7:07-CV-00449, 2007 WL 3275151, at *1 (W.D. Va. Nov. 5, 2007); 
Walonoski v. Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Sys., Inc., No. 3:07-CV-00198(PCD), 2007 
WL 3226181, at *2 (D. Conn. Oct. 30, 2007); Maturen v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 06-
CV-15126, 2007 WL 3173962, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 26, 2007); Brigando v. Walt Disney 
World Co., No. 06-1191(SRC), 2007 WL 3124702, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2007); Aldana v. 
RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 2:06-3366-CWH, 2007 WL 3020497, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 12, 
2007); Ginsberg v. Gov’t Props. Trust, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 365(CSH)(ECF), 2007 WL 
2981683, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2007); Gambill v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 1:06-CV-
00724, 2007 WL 2902939, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2007); Johnson v. Geico Cas. Co., 516 
F. Supp. 2d 351, 355 (D. Del. 2007); Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. Ideal World Direct, 516 F. 
Supp. 2d 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Performance Aftermarkets Parts Group, Ltd. v. TI Group 
Auto. Sys., LLC, No. H-05-4251, 2007 WL 2818269, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2007); 
Eastwood v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-164, 2007 WL 2815560, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 
25, 2007); Arnold Chevrolet LLC v. Tribune Co., No. 04-CV-3097(DRH)(WDW), 2007 
WL 2743490, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2007); Promotional Ins. Co. v. Shah, No. 07-
1774, 2007 WL 2713243, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2007); Totalogistix, Inc. v. Marjack Co., 
No. 06-5117 (JAG), 2007 WL 2705152, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2007); Multimedia Patent 
Trust v. Microsoft Corp., No. 07-CV-0747-H(CAB), 2007 WL 2696675, at *7 (S.D. Cal. 
Sept. 10, 2007); Mazzaro De Abreu v. Bank of Am. Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 381, 387 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); Shirk v. Garrow, 505 F. Supp. 2d 169, 171–72 (D.D.C. 2007); Druyan v. 
Jagger, 508 F. Supp. 2d 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Whitesell Corp. v. Bamal Fasteners LLC, 
No. C-3:07-CV-099, 2007 WL 2407049, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2007); Frutera Real 
S.A. v. Fresh Quest, Inc., 2007-2 Trade Cases ¶ 75,818 (S.D. Fla. 2007); Dever v. Kelley, No. 
3:06-CV-392, 2007 WL 2286279, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 6, 2007); Nicholson v. Tweedy, 
No. 06 CV 471 (RJD)(RML), 2007 WL 2262912, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2007).  
A C D B
Deny motion to dismiss
pre- and post-Twombly 
Grant or deny motion 
post-Twombly
Grant motion to dismiss 
pre- and post-Twombly 
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decide the impact of Twombly because the result would be the same 
under pre-Twombly and post-Twombly law,115 or merely cite language 
from Twombly to support the decision they would have arrived at 
anyway.116 
Segment BC (or, if drawn to scale, a segment a fraction of the 
size shown) signifies the cases where courts’ discretion to recalibrate 
the balance between pleading requirements and the costs of 
discovery may affect the result. Common sense and language in 
Twombly dictate what factors courts consider when exercising 
discretion under the Court’s flexible “plausibility standard.” Not 
surprisingly, the most important consideration is the complexity of 
the case on the assumption that more complex cases involve more 
discovery. As Justice Stevens recognized,117 Twombly was a decision 
primarily driven by a desire to protect defendants from the burdens 
of pretrial discovery. Unless the costs of discovery are likely to be 
high, there is little reason to require greater detail in a complaint that 
provides notice or to terminate the case before summary 
judgment.118 Thus, courts are more likely to require greater detail in 
 
 115. See, e.g., Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 n.7 (4th Cir. 2007); 
Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 
U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. June 16, 2008) (No. 07-1015); E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., 
Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2007); IFAST, Ltd. v. Alliance for Telecomm. Indep. 
Solutions, Inc., No. CCB-06-2088, 2007 WL 3224582, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2007); 
Eastwood, 2007 WL 2815560, at *2 n.1; Massey Energy Co. v. Sup. Ct. of App. of W. Va., 
No. 2:06-0614, 2007 WL 2778239, at *3 n.4 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 21, 2007); McGowan v. 
Cantrell, No. 1:05-CV-334, 2007 WL 2509704, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 30, 2007); Dodd v. 
Woods Mem’l Hosp., No. 1:06-CV-56, 2007 WL 2463275, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 28, 
2007).  
 116. See, e.g., Skaff v. Meridien N. Am. Beverly Hills, LLC, 506 F.3d 832, 841–42 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (denying motion to dismiss and citing Twombly for the proposition that heightened 
pleading is not required under Rule 8); McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356–
57 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (overruling motion to dismiss, relying upon Twombly’s citation of Conley’s 
notice pleading standard and approval of Form 9); Darrick Enters. v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 
No. 05-4359(NLH), 2007 WL 2893366, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2007) (denying most parts 
of the defendants’ motion to dismiss and citing Twombly after defining the issue as “whether 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint gives Defendants fair notice of their claims, and ‘not whether [Plaintiffs] 
will ultimately prevail but whether [Plaintiffs are] entitled to offer evidence to support the 
claim.’”). 
 117. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1989 (2007).  
 118. See, e.g., Brown v. Kerkhoff, 504 F. Supp. 2d 464, 521 (S.D. Iowa 2007); In re 
Holland, 374 B.R. 409, 443 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007).  
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putative class actions, and complex RICO or securities cases.119 
Routine cases typically are unaffected by Twombly. 
A second factor, also affecting the likely cost of discovery, is the 
availability of an early summary judgment motion. For example, in 
Johnson & Johnson v. Guidant Corp., the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant breached a merger agreement by providing information to 
a third party.120 The agreement forbade the defendant from soliciting 
a takeover proposal but allowed it to provide information to parties 
making unsolicited offers.121 Despite the fact that the complaint did 
not allege that the third party’s proposal was solicited, the court 
denied a motion to dismiss, reasoning, “If there is an inquiry or 
communication constituting a Takeover Proposal by Abbott [the 
third party], defendants will surely produce it and move for summary 
judgment in short order.”122 Also relevant to the probable discovery 
costs is the court’s confidence in its ability to structure limited 
discovery.123 
Two other factors courts consider when exercising their 
discretion under Twombly focus on whether or not a dismissal will 
terminate a meritorious claim. The first, which courts have obviously 
derived from Twombly, is the plausibility of the plaintiff’s claim. At a 
minimum, the Court’s flexible “plausibility standard” requires 
greater detail when something about the claim seems facially 
 
 119. See, e.g., United States v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Assoc., No. 05-CV-3212, 2007 WL 
3196679 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2007) (RICO); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 560, 
593 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (securities); Walker v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 517 F. Supp. 2d 801 (E.D. Va. 
2007) (putative class action); In re Bausch & Lomb, Inc. Contact Lens Solution Products 
Liab. Litig., No. 2:06-MN-77777-DCN, 2007 WL 3046682, at *5–7 (D.S.C. Oct. 11, 2007) 
(class action); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., Nos. 04-5184(GEB), 05-1079(GEB), 
2007 WL 2892700 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2007) (class action RICO claims); Parrish v. Nat’l 
Football League Players Ass’n, No. C 07-00943WHA, 2007 WL 2601385 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 
2007) (putative class action); Cannon v. Gunnallen Fin., Inc., No. 3:06-0804, 2007 WL 
2351313 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 14, 2007) (securities). RICO and Securities actions often involve 
allegations of fraud and therefore, in part, are subject to heightened pleading under Rule 9, 
regardless of Twombly.  
 120. Johnson & Johnson v. Guidant Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 336, 34244 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007). 
 121. Id. at 342–43. 
 122. Id. at 357. 
 123. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 
2931 (2008). 
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questionable or not literally plausible.124 For example, in Ryan v. 
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.125 the plaintiff alleged that he was 
wrongfully terminated in response to his letter to the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology questioning the government’s 
explanation for the collapses of the World Trade Center buildings on 
September 11, 2001. The court granted a motion to dismiss, finding 
that the complaint did not contain sufficient facts to explain why a 
private employer’s dismissal following an employee’s criticism of the 
government fell under the policy exception to the at-will 
employment doctrine.126 
The second consideration related to the merits of the plaintiff’s 
claim is whether the plaintiff has omitted specific facts that should be 
in the plaintiff’s hands.127 If a plaintiff omits a necessary fact that she 
should possess, a dismissal with leave to amend will not terminate 
the litigation unless the necessary fact cannot be truthfully alleged.128 
In the latter case, a dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. To 
illustrate, in In re Bausch & Lomb, Inc., the defendant sold a contact 
lens solution that had a propensity to cause serious eye infections.129 
The CDC and FDA issued a joint statement warning wearers of soft 
contact lenses that they were at risk, and the defendant ceased 
 
 124. See, e.g., Ryan v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., No. 1:06-CV-1770-JDT-TAB, 2007 WL 
2316474 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 8, 2007); Jenkins v. County of Hennepin, No. 06-3625, 2007 WL 
2287840 (D. Minn. Aug. 3, 2007). 
 125. Ryan, 2007 WL 2316474, at *1. 
 126. Id. at *9–11. Literal application of the plausibility standard has also been used to 
deny a motion to dismiss. In Garmin Ltd. v. TomTom, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-338(LED), 2007 
WL 2903843, at *12 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2007), the defendant in a patent infringement 
action counterclaimed for invalidation of the patent based on failure to disclose prior art. The 
defendant alleged that executives toured the plant of a company with existing technology and 
learned confidential information, but did not allege that the executives took part in the 
application process. Id. at *2. Nonetheless, the court denied a motion to dismiss finding it 
“plausible that the executives disseminated their knowledge to the applicant group before 
filing.” Id. 
 127. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 
2007); Walker v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 517 F. Supp. 2d 801, 808–09 (E.D. Va. 2007); In re 
Bausch & Lomb, Inc. Contact Lens Solution Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:06-MN-77777-DCN, 
2007 WL 3046682, at *7 (D.S.C. Oct. 11, 2007); Polzin v. Barna & Co., No.3:07-CV-127, 
2007 WL 2710705, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2007); Parrish v. Nat’l Football League 
Players Ass’n, No. C 07-00943-WHA, 2007 WL 2601385, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2007).  
 128.  5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 1357, 611–13 (“Thus, the cases make it clear that leave to amend the 
complaint should be refused only if it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff cannot state a 
claim.”). 
 129. Bausch & Lomb, 2007 WL 3046682, at *7.  
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shipping its product.130 Plaintiffs’ class action sought, inter alia, 
economic damages for contract breach but did not allege that any 
plaintiffs poured out the defendant’s product following the 
government warnings.131 Despite counsel’s representations that such 
plaintiffs were in the class, the court dismissed that count of the 
complaint without prejudice, insisting that without such allegations, 
the complaint could not allege economic injury.132 If the plaintiffs 
could not make such an allegation, the claim for economic damages 
would be properly dismissed with prejudice. 
One might question whether the number of cases actually 
affected by Twombly justifies the added Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss litigation spawned by the Court’s opinion. However, in the 
first six months post-Twombly, lower courts in non-antitrust cases 
generally have reasonably exercised their discretion under the 
Court’s “plausibility test.” The factors they have considered logically 
relate to balancing the costs of discovery and the danger of 
dismissing meritorious claims. Hopefully, as precedent continues to 
develop, and it becomes even clearer that Twombly does not affect 
routine cases, the amount of additional pleading motions filed will 
decrease. 
B. Antitrust Cases 
As with non-antitrust cases,133 most antitrust cases have been 
unaffected by Twombly. Again, corresponding to segments AB and 
CD in Diagram 1,134 courts find pleadings satisfactory even under 
Twombly,135 or believe the allegations insufficient under any 
standard.136 
 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at *7. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text. 
 134. See Diagram 1, supra p. 1071.  
 135. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Omnicare, Inc. v. United Health Group, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Xerox 
Corp. v. Media Sciences Int’l, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Behrend v. 
Comcast Corp., 532 F. Supp. 2d 735 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Securitypoint Media, LLC v. Adason 
Group, LLC, No. 8-07-cv-444-T-24TGW, 2007 WL 2298024 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2007); In 
re Hypodermic Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 05-CV-1602 (JLL/CCC), 2007 WL 1959225 
(D.N.J. June 29, 2007).  
 136. See, e.g., Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Ne., Inc., 507 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 
2007); Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Ditropan XL Antitrust 
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One might expect that the area of discretion, segment BC,137 
where Twombly can affect a case’s outcome, would be greater for 
antitrust cases. Such cases are the paradigmatic example of complex 
litigation with burdensome discovery and are more likely to raise 
plausibility issues. In fact, however, outside the context of allegations 
of parallel conduct,138 Twombly has not affected outcomes in this 
segment during its first six months.139 Perhaps this is because a 
claim’s plausibility has always been a consideration in antitrust 
cases.140 
However, in oligopoly pricing cases, cases alleging high parallel 
prices in an industry dominated by just a few competitors, Twombly 
has had a dramatic effect.141 Before addressing such cases and 
analyzing whether lower courts’ decisions reflect a proper and 
desirable interpretation of Twombly, a digression on the oligopoly 
problem is helpful. 
1. The oligopoly problem 
In an industry with few sellers, economic performance may 
deviate significantly from the competitive norm. Prices may be 
maintained at inflated levels and respond slowly to changes in costs 
and demand, output may be reduced, rivalry may be channeled into 
 
Litig., No. M:06-CV-01761-JSW, 2007 WL 2978329 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2007); Justice v. 
Town of Cicero, No. 06 C 1108, 2007 WL 2973851 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2007); Spa 
Universaire v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l., Inc., Nos. 02-cv-01977-RPM, 02-cv-01778-RPM, 
2007 WL 2694918 (D. Colo. Sept. 10, 2007); Cargill Inc. v. Budine, No. CV-F-07-349-LJO-
SMS, 2007 WL 2506451 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2007). 
 137. See Diagram 1, supra p. 1071. 
 138. See, e.g., In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007); In re Travel 
Agent Comm’n Antitrust Litig., No. 1:03 CV 30000, 2007 WL 3171675 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 
29, 2007); In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 
2007); Hackman v. Dickerson Realtors, Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 954 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Schafer v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F. Supp. 2d 587 (E.D. La. 2007).  
 139. In the first six months after Twombly, the only antitrust case not involving 
allegations of parallel conduct that may have been affected by the Supreme Court decision was 
Nicsand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 450–51 (6th Cir. 2007). Even that case may be 
explained more by the court’s cramped, if not improper, reading of exclusive dealing precedent 
than by changes to pleading law. See id. at 453.  
 140. See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
 141. See, e.g., In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47; In re Graphics Processing Units 
Antitrust Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1011; In re Travel Agent Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 2007 WL 
3171675. 
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socially unproductive forms, and technological change or other 
innovation may be inhibited.142 
Such poor economic performance may be the result of explicit 
collusion. Where there are few sellers, it is easier for the market 
participants to agree on price and output decisions and to detect and 
respond to cheating.143 When oligopoly pricing is the result of formal 
agreement, a court will hold the agreement per se illegal.144 
However, formal agreement is not necessary for an oligopoly to 
demonstrate poor economic performance. Parallel prices at supra-
competitive levels may result from recognized interdependence. 
Oligopoly firms know that their “price and output decisions will 
have a noticeable impact on the market and on its rivals.”145 A firm 
realizes that if it reduces prices to increase sales at the expense of its 
rivals, its competitors will notice the sales loss and take retaliatory 
action.146 The result will be unchanged market share and reduced 
prices, which result in reduced profits throughout the market—a 
price war that every firm in the industry loses. Thus, as rational 
decisionmakers, the firm’s managers, recognizing their company’s 
shared interdependence with other firms, may forego active price 
 
 142. See IIA PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 404d2, 
at 21–22 (2d ed. 2002); LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 347 
(1977). 
 143. RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, 66–68 (2d ed. 2001). “Cheating” refers to 
acting in a competitor’s individual interest as opposed to the collective interest.  
 144. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). A 
per se rule allows a court to find certain agreements or practices illegal without elaborate 
inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business justification for their use. The 
truncated analysis is justified by the belief that agreements or practices subject to per se 
treatment have such a pernicious effect on competition and lack any redeeming value that their 
unreasonableness may be presumed. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 
(1958).  
 145. VI AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 142, ¶ 1429a, at 206 (2d ed. 2003); see 
also id. ¶ 1425, at 167–85.  
 146. Id. ¶ 1429a, at 207; POSNER, supra note 143, at 56. As Judge Posner explains, if 
“there are three sellers of equal size, a 20 percent expansion of sales of one will cause the sales 
of each of the others to fall by an average of 10 percent—a sales loss that victims could hardly 
overlook.” Id. By contrast, in a competitive market, there are so many sellers that a single firm 
“could double its output without any expectation that total supply would be so affected as to 
cause any price change; the effects of the firm’s increased sales would be so diffused among its 
numerous competitors that they would not be aware of any change.” VI AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 142, ¶ 1429a, at 206.  
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competition and maintain high parallel prices, even in the absence of 
formal agreement.147 
The law consistently has held that consciously parallel prices 
alone are not enough to prove agreement.148 Interpreted literally, the 
 
 147. See VI AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 142, ¶ 1429a, at 207; FRANK SCHERER, 
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 514 (2d ed. 1980). This is 
not to suggest that high prices are inevitable in an oligopoly market—far from it. As evidenced 
by the breakdown of legal international cartels such as OPEC, even when there is explicit 
collusion, individual firms have a major incentive to “cheat” on their agreement. At supra-
competitive prices, small discounts can result in significant increases in output at still very 
profitable prices. See POSNER, supra note 143, at 67. Factors that increase the likelihood of a 
non-competitive result include product homogeneity, common knowledge of rivals’ decisions, 
a small number of competitors, infinitely repeated pricing decisions, and identical cost 
structures. See infra note 154. These factors all affect the ease with which the parties can reach 
agreement and detect and punish deviations. For a game theory analysis of possible oligopoly 
market outcomes, see Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: 
Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719 (2004), and 
DOUGLAS BAIRD, ROBERT BERTNER & RANDAL PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 
(1994).  
Business school faculty now “routinely” counsel students to implement practices that 
would facilitate coordination should they become employed in oligopoly industries. Jonathan 
Baker, Two Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary 
Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 197 n.106 (Spring 1993). “Facilitating 
practices,” such as most favored nation clauses, pre-announcement of price changes, meeting 
competition policies and information exchanges (either directly or through the press), make it 
easier to reach an interdependent result and can themselves be adopted interdependently. For 
an explanation of how such practices can help achieve a non-competitive result, see VI AREEDA 
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 142, ¶ 1435, at 251–68; Lee Goldman, Oligopoly Policy and the 
Ethyl Corp. Case, 65 OR. L. REV. 73, 75–76 (1986); George Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly 
and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 454–55 (1982).  
 148. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
227–32 (1993); Williamson Oil Co. v. Phillip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1298–99 (11th 
Cir. 2003); Reserve Supply Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 971 F.2d 37, 50 (7th 
Cir. 1992); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988). 
Courts, however, find agreement based on consciously parallel prices with certain “plus 
factors.” See, e.g., City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 570–71 (11th 
Cir. 1998); Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1232 
(3d Cir. 1993). The most commonly cited such plus factor is whether the defendant’s conduct 
was contrary to its self-interest if acting alone. See, e.g., Blomkest Fertilizer v. Potash Corp. of 
Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000); Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 
246, 254 (2d Cir. 1987); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3rd Cir. 1977); 
Fears v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 2004-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 74,351, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 
423 (2007). While the “plus factor” analysis is often useful in competitive markets to 
distinguish conspiratorial from independent conduct, it has limited utility in oligopoly markets. 
The fundamental problem, of course, is that plus factor analysis is designed to prove 
agreement, yet as explained above, agreement is not needed to have poor economic 
performance in an oligopoly. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 
2004); POSNER, supra note 143, at 100.  
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law could not be otherwise. Even in a competitive market, one 
expects parallel prices and that rivals will be conscious of them. 
Courts typically equate interdependence/oligopoly pricing with 
conscious parallelism. As a result of this equivalence, and because 
consciously parallel prices alone are not enough to prove a § 1 
agreement, oligopoly pricing is by itself insufficient to satisfy § 1’s 
agreement requirement.149 
Judge Posner, in his academic writings, has suggested that the 
law should not distinguish between interdependence and 
agreement.150 Judge Posner reasons that oligopoly theorists overstate 
the incidence of successful interdependence.151 He believes that in 
most markets more formal mechanisms for cooperation are required 
to achieve supra-competitive pricing. Thus, what appears to be 
interdependence is more likely unproven explicit agreement.152 More 
fundamental, the effects of interdependence are identical to express 
collusion—higher prices and reduced output.153 Thus, Judge Posner 
would rather focus on economic data than traditional concepts of 
agreement. In markets conducive to collusion that demonstrate poor 
economic performance, he would find a violation whether or not 
formal agreement had been proven.154  
 
 149. See, e.g., Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 227; Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1032.  
 150. See POSNER, supra note 143, at 55–56.  
 151. See id. at 57–59. First, Judge Posner challenges oligopoly theory’s assumption that a 
seller will be reluctant to initiate price reductions knowing that they will be matched by its 
rivals. Id. at 57. He argues that this assumes that the rivals’ response will be immediate and 
ignores the possibility of significant interim profits. Id. Second, he asserts that oligopoly theory 
“overstates the impact of one oligopolist’s price reduction on the sales of the others, and hence 
the incentive of the others to respond immediately.” Id. He points out that the increase in 
output resulting from a price reduction does not come exclusively from the sales of the 
oligopolist’s rivals. Rather, some of those sales are to new buyers. Id. at 57–58. Finally, Judge 
Posner questions the ability of oligopolists to establish a supra-competitive price in the first 
instance. Id. at 58–59.  
 152. Id. at 98; accord ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 175, 181–91 (1978); 
Kenneth Elzinga, New Developments on the Cartel Front, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 3, 25 (1984); 
Werden, supra note 147, at 762–63, 780.  
 153. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws, 
89 MINN. L. REV. 9, 22–23 (2004).  
 154. POSNER, supra note 143, at 69. Conditions favorable to collusion include: (1) high 
concentration; (2) the absence of small fringe sellers; (3) inelastic demand at competitive 
prices; (4) difficulty of entry; (5) an unconcentrated buyer market; (6) homogeneous products; 
(7) nondurable products; (8) firms sell at the same level in the chain of distribution; (9) little 
non-price competition; (10) high ratio of fixed to variable costs; (11) similar cost structures 
and production processes; (12) static or declining demand; (13) the ability to change prices 
quickly; (14) sealed bidding; (15) local markets; (16) history of cooperation; and (17) prior 
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The language of the Sherman Act, as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, is certainly malleable enough to treat interdependent pricing 
as agreement.155 Nonetheless, the problem with treating 
interdependence as agreement, a problem Judge Posner 
acknowledges,156 is formulating a remedy. The obvious choice of 
remedy is to enjoin the defendants from considering the likely 
reactions of their rivals or agreeing through tacit coordination.157 
However, such an injunction is tantamount to requiring the 
defendants to price competitively or at where price equals marginal 
cost.158 
 
antitrust record. Id. at 69–79. Indicators of poor performance include: (1) fixed relative market 
shares; (2) market-wide price discrimination; (3) exchanges of price information; (4) regional 
price variations; (5) identical bids; (6) sudden and parallel price, output, and capacity changes; 
(7) industry-wide resale price, maintenance; (8) declining market shares of the leaders; (9) 
smaller and less frequent price changes; (10) demand elastic at the market price; (11) 
excessively high profits; (12) market inversely correlated with the number of firms or the 
elasticity of demand; (13) base-point pricing; and (14) exclusionary practices. Id. at 79–93.  
 155. See, e.g., id. at 94–96; John Lopatka, Solving the Oligopoly Problem, Turner’s Try, 41 
ANTITRUST BULL. 843, 853–54 (1996); Donald Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under 
the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 664–65 
(1962); Werden, supra note 147, at 777–78. Surely one can conceptualize interdependence as 
agreement. Assume sellers A and B originally price their product at one dollar and a price war 
ensues. After a period of dueling price cuts, prices fall to fifty cents. If seller A then sets price at 
$1.20, seller B knows it can either match that price and return to profitability or face a 
continued price war when A, losing sales, retracts its price increase. Even in the absence of 
verbal communication, A’s price move to $1.20 can be viewed as an offer and B’s price 
matching as an acceptance.  
 156. See POSNER, supra note 143, at 98–99.  
 157. The primary alternative remedy suggested by early commentators was to improve 
market structure through divestiture of the largest oligopoly companies. See, e.g., CARL 
KAYSEN & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 266–72 (1959); Report of the White House 
Task Force on Antitrust Policy, reprinted in 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 11, 30–33 (1969); 
Louis B. Schwartz, New Approaches to the Control of Oligopoly, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 47 
(1960). These proposals have been discredited and generally abandoned. See, e.g., Goldman, 
supra note 147, at 93–97; Baker, supra note 147, at 173 n.56. See POSNER, supra note 143, at 
101; Lopatka, supra note 155, at 904. For a discussion and rejection of other theoretical 
remedies, see VI AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 142, ¶ 1432d5, at 232–34.  
 158. In a perfectly competitive market, price should equal marginal cost, the cost of 
producing one additional unit. See FTC v. Indep. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 
(1986); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY, AND 
PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 52 (5th ed. 2003); LAWRENCE SULLIVAN & 
WARREN GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 32 (2000). If price 
exceeds marginal cost, the competitor can increase profits by producing additional units. If 
price were below marginal cost, the producer would be losing money on each sale. Therefore, 
profits will be maximized in a competitive market when price and marginal cost are the same.  
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Such an injunction is not workable for three reasons. First, it is 
unrealistic to require an oligopoly to conform to a model for perfect 
competition when few, if any, industries are perfectly competitive, if 
only because of location advantages, incomplete information, or 
other market imperfections. Second, a court constantly would have 
to review the reasonableness of the defendants’ prices to measure 
compliance with the injunction. This would be equivalent to 
requiring rate regulation, which virtually all commentators 
deplore.159 It is a task for which a court is particularly ill-equipped 
and one that the Supreme Court has specifically eschewed.160 Third, 
and most fundamentally, an injunction that requires price to equal 
marginal cost virtually guarantees the defendant will be exposed to 
liability. If a defendant with market power were to set a price below 
 
 159. See, e.g., LOUIS SCHWARTZ, JOHN FLYNN & HARRY FIRST, FREE ENTERPRISE AND 
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: ANTITRUST 444 (6th ed. 1983); Mark Green & Ralph Nader, 
Economic Regulation v. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871 (1973); 
William K. Jones, Government Price Controls and Inflation: A Prognosis Based on the Impact of 
Controls in the Regulated Industries, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 303, 316, 318–24 (1980); Richard 
Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 619, 643 (1969); 
Richard Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. 
REV. 1207, 1231–35 (1969). Legal proceedings are not well adapted to the job of sifting 
complex economic data and arriving at a sound judgment as to price. The net result may be 
that price is too low to cover costs. A firm may thus be inclined to cut corners on quality. See 
Green & Nader, supra, at 877; Posner, supra, at 594. Further, there may be insufficient 
reserves to finance plant expansion, thus causing a distortion in the allocation of resources. See 
Posner, supra, at 604. More likely, the price set will be too high. That encourages inefficiency 
or economic waste, results in resource misallocation and officially sanctions undesirable 
behavior. See BORK, supra note 152, at 184. The prospect of a rate setting hearing can also 
reduce incentives for efficiency and innovation (because returns will be limited) and encourage 
over-investment in capital resources (because rates are often based on returns per investment). 
See Green & Nader, supra, at 877; Posner, supra, at 597, 599–600; Turner, supra, at 1232, 
1235. These problems are further exacerbated if the industry members have different cost 
structures. See Jones, supra, at 319. Finally, whether the price is set too low or too high, there 
are enormous judicial and administrative resources being used, resources that can be better 
spent elsewhere. Indeed, recognition of the ineffectiveness of rate regulation has led to 
congressional deregulation of previously regulated industries. See Airline Deregulation Act of 
1978, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1985); Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (1982).  
 160. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1927):  
The reasonable price fixed today may through economic and business changes 
become the unreasonable price of to-morrow [sic]. . . . [I]n the absence of express 
legislation requiring it, we should hesitate to adopt a construction making the 
difference between legal and illegal conduct in the field of business relations depend 
upon so uncertain a test as whether prices are reasonable—a determination which 
can be satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of our economic organization 
and a choice between rival philosophies.  
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marginal cost, it likely would be liable for predatory pricing.161 If it 
set a price above marginal cost, it would have violated the 
injunction.162 Given the imprecision of marginal cost analysis,163 
placing a defendant at such risk is indefensible.164 
Thus, oligopoly markets are problematic because a collusive 
result can be reached without formal agreement. Although one can 
conceptualize interdependence as agreement, the law does not 
recognize it as such. However, as Justice Breyer stated when he sat 
on the First Circuit Court of Appeals, interdependence is legal “not 
 
 161. Most courts consider price below marginal cost or its surrogate, average variable 
cost, prima facie evidence of predatory pricing. See Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–23 (1993); Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1184, 
1193 (9th Cir. 1984); Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1056 
(6th Cir. 1984); III AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 142, ¶ 723, at 280–81.  
 162. If price was between marginal cost and average total cost, the defendant 
simultaneously might still be sued for predatory pricing. Many courts allow proof that prices 
above marginal or average variable cost, but below average total cost, are predatory. See 
Adjusters Replace-A-Car, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 735 F.2d 884, 889–90 (5th Cir. 
1984); Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc., 729 F.2d at 1056; III AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 142, ¶ 723, at 290–91. 
 163. See III AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 142, ¶ 724d, at 292–93; Goldman, 
supra note 147, at 84–86; William H. Melody, The Marginal Utility of Marginal Analysis in 
Public Policy Formulation, 8 J. ECON. ISSUES 287 (1974).  
 164.  The remedy problem might be alleviated if liability required a showing that prices 
“greatly exceeded” competitive levels. Relief could then be limited to an injunction prohibiting 
such pricing. The defendant would not face virtually certain liability. It could legally price 
anywhere between marginal cost and the cutoff for “greatly excessive” pricing. Nonetheless, 
practical problems would remain. First, consensus would have to be reached concerning what 
constituted a greatly excessive price. Second, proving that such a price was reached would be 
litigation intensive, probably requiring classification and analysis of industry members’ costs. 
Given the possibility, or rather, likelihood of changing demand and costs, enforcement of the 
injunction would strikingly resemble rate regulation. Third, and most fundamental, there is no 
basis for such a requirement in the language of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 
One possible solution to these problems might be for the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) to challenge oligopoly pricing as an unfair method of competition under section 5 of 
the FTC Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2008). Section 5 is limited to FTC enforcement and 
covers acts that violate the spirit or policy of the antitrust laws, even if not specifically within 
those laws’ terms. See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972); FTC v. 
Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922). The FTC might be trusted to pursue only 
the most extreme cases. Such an approach would be analogous to the European Union’s 
treatment of monopoly pricing. The Treaty of Rome prohibits a dominant firm from imposing 
unfair prices, see Article 82(a) of the Treaty of Rome (1957), and the European Commission 
has held the language to preclude excessive monopoly pricing. See Michael Gal, Monopoly 
Pricing as an Antitrust Offense in the U.S. and the EU: Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly?, 
49 ANTITRUST BULL. 343, 358–59 (2004). However, the difficulty and infrequency of 
successful prosecution under EC law of monopoly pricing, see id. at 367–76, may be reason 
enough to be less than sanguine about the FTC’s ability to regulate oligopoly pricing.  
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because such pricing is desirable (it is not), but because it is close to 
impossible to devise a judicially enforceable remedy.”165 
2. The relevance of Twombly to the oligopoly problem 
Twombly clearly indicates that allegations of parallel prices are 
insufficient to state a claim.166 As suggested earlier, the law could not 
be different.167 Parallel prices are to be expected in all industries, 
whether competitive, interdependent, or collusive. However, the 
opinion is ambiguous as to how to treat parallel pricing at supra-
competitive levels or so-called interdependent pricing. 
Twombly states that Monsanto and Matsushita “made it clear that 
neither parallel conduct nor conscious parallelism, taken alone, raise 
the necessary implication of conspiracy.”168 Those cases, as the Court 
acknowledged,169 involved motions for summary judgment post-
discovery, not motions to dismiss. Nonetheless, nowhere in the 
opinion does the Court say that a lesser standard is applicable to the 
pleading stage. Indeed, the Court implied that interdependence is 
not sufficient for agreement at the pleading stage when it found the 
ILECs’ decision not to compete as CLECs did not suggest 
agreement because “a natural explanation for the noncompetition 
alleged is that the former Government-sanctioned monopolists were 
sitting tight, expecting their neighbors to do the same thing [that is, 
they were acting interdependently].”170 Also revealing is the Court’s 
citation, with seeming approval, of commentators’ examples of 
parallel conduct allegations that would state a § 1 claim.171 
 
 165. Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cit. 1988); 
accord Reserve Supply Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 971 F.2d 37, 50 (7th Cir. 
1992). Indeed, this is the reason many commentators suggest that, absent a pro-competitive 
justification, practices that facilitate interdependent pricing should be illegal whether or not 
there is agreement. See, e.g., VI AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 142, ¶ 1436a, at 268–70; 
POSNER, supra note 143, at 99; Goldman, supra note 147; Hay, supra note 147, at 480–81; 
Lopatka, supra note 155, at 906. Such a finding can reduce the incidence of the undesirable 
supra-competitive pricing and, unlike for oligopoly pricing alone, a remedy is easily defined: 
don’t engage in the facilitating practice.  
 166. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007). 
 167. See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.  
 168. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968 n.7. The Court defines conscious parallelism as 
interdependent decision-making. Id. at 1964. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 1972. 
 171. Id. at 1965 n.4. 
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Noticeably absent from the commentators’ examples is the case of 
supra-competitive pricing by oligopoly firms.172 In fact, the two 
sources cited suggest that interdependent pricing should not be 
taken as agreement, albeit in the framework of establishing liability 
rather than surviving a motion to dismiss.173 Finally, the Court’s 
apparent weighing of evidence and facile dismissal of both the 
plaintiffs’ allegations that the CLECs could be profitable and 
Notebaert’s supporting statement174 suggest that the Court’s intent 
was to tighten pleading standards for § 1 cases based on assertions of 
parallel conduct. 
On the other hand, Twombly can be interpreted as limited to 
allegations of parallel conduct where the facts alleged make 
agreement implausible.175 The Court found that the conduct alleged 
would logically occur unilaterally, regardless of the actions of 
competitors.176 The ILECs had an independent incentive to deter 
competitors and to avoid non-profitable markets and knew that their 
fellow ILECs had the same incentives. In this situation, there was no 
reason to enter into an agreement. By contrast, in the oligopoly 
pricing setting, allegations of agreement are plausible.177 Competitors 
have an incentive to enter into a formal agreement to facilitate supra-
competitive pricing and decrease the possibility of cheating.178 
Oligopoly pricing allegations also tend to support a finding of 
agreement by eliminating the possibility of completely independent 
behavior.179 If you believe Judge Posner’s and other commentators’ 
 
 172. See VI AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 142, ¶ 1425, at 167–85; Michael D. 
Blechman, Conscious Parallelism, Signaling and Facilitating Devices: The Problem of Tacit 
Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 881, 899 (1979).  
 173. See VI AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 142, ¶ 1425, at 167; Blechman, supra 
note 172, at 898.  
 174. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1972–73 & n.13. 
 175. Plaintiffs traditionally have been required to present more evidence when antitrust 
claims are implausible. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574, 593 (1986) (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762–64 
(1984)); In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2002).  
 176. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1971–73 & n.14. 
 177. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 178. See VI AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 142, ¶ 1432, at 225.  
 179. See In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 504 F. Supp. 2d 38, 53 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(citing In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d at 361). By defining oligopoly pricing as 
parallel pricing at a supra-competitive level, no competitor would independently, as opposed to 
interdependently, maintain price at the oligopoly pricing level. At that level, unless 
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view of the likelihood of interdependence, such allegations are not 
merely plausible, but strongly suggest agreement.180 Moreover, 
where oligopoly pricing is alleged, the costs of discovery deter the 
undesirable conduct that the law would like to make illegal but 
cannot due to the absence of an effective remedy.181 Thus, the cost 
of discovery, the apparent driving force behind Twombly,182 is of 
minimal, if any, concern. 
3. Lower courts’ treatment of oligopoly pricing post-Twombly 
In the first six months following the decision, lower courts 
generally have read Twombly broadly to require dismissal of oligopoly 
pricing cases for failure to state a claim. In a case from the airline 
industry, In re Travel Agent Commission Antitrust Litigation,183 
travel agents sued airlines claiming that they conspired to reduce and 
eliminate travel commissions between 1995 and 2002.184 The 
complaint alleged that the defendants met at industry association 
meetings and trade shows, as part of joint business ventures, on the 
golf course, as well as at private meetings, and asserted that 
agreement was reached “at a time unknown.”185 The complaint 
detailed a pattern of commission reductions that were announced by 
the five major airline defendants within a week of each other.186 The 
plaintiffs’ allegation that the defendants’ actions were against their 
self-interest if acting alone was supported by the testimony of a 
former executive vice president of one of the defendants.187 Finally, 
the complaint also contained details about the industry’s history of 
collusion.188 
 
competitors’ responses are considered, a competitor would be able to greatly increase its profits 
by slightly lowering price. 
 180. See POSNER, supra note 143 and accompanying text.  
 181. See supra notes 157–64 and accompanying text.  
 182. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.  
 183. No. 1:03 CV 30000, 2007 WL 3171675 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 29, 2007). 
 184. Id. at *3. 
 185. Id. at *8–9. 
 186. Id. at *3–4. 
 187. Id. at *10. The executive’s statement, although eliminating the possibility of 
competitive conduct, also was consistent with, and in its entirety seemed to suggest, 
interdependent conduct. Id. at *10–11.  
 188. Id. at *11. 
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The court dismissed the complaint, holding that “Twombly 
requires more than averments of parallel conduct, and ‘without some 
further factual enhancement [the complaint] stops short of the line 
between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’”189 
Citing pre-Twombly cases decided on summary judgment or directed 
verdict, the court said, “an opportunity to conspire does not satisfy 
Plaintiff’s burden of proving a price-fixing agreement.”190 It 
dismissed the statement of the former executive as supporting 
interdependence, but not agreement.191 Again citing summary 
judgment precedent, the court said that “to support an inference of 
conspiracy, ‘evidence of action that is against self-interest must go 
beyond mere interdependence.’”192 Finally, relying on yet another 
summary judgment case, the court dismissed the allegations of a 
history of collusion because it “does not tend to exclude the 
possibility that Defendants were engaged in lawful conduct.”193 
Allegations of an oligopoly market behaving poorly were even 
more powerful in In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust 
Litigation.194 Plaintiffs alleged that the two defendants controlled the 
entire graphic processing unit (“GPU”) market195 and that the 
market was characterized by upward pricing trends beginning in 
2002, while most other consumer electronics experienced downward 
pricing trends.196 According to the plaintiffs, the increase in prices 
occurred despite decreases in the price of the component parts of 
GPUs and excess industry capacity.197 They further alleged that the 
defendants met secretly at trade conferences and agreed to 
coordinate the timing of the release of new products and fixed the 
price of competing products.198 The complaint contained details of 
the industry meetings, the dates the new products were introduced, 
 
 189. Id. at *9 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007)). 
 190. Id. (citing Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc., 998 F.2d 1224, 1242 n.15 (3d Cir. 
1993); Weit v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank, 641 F.2d 457, 468–69 (7th Cir. 1981)). 
 191.  Id. at *11. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id. (quotation omitted). 
 194. 527 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 195. GPUs process and display computer graphics, including graphics for three-
dimensional and video applications. Id. at 1013–14. 
 196. Id. at 1014. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
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and the announced prices at their introduction.199 Finally, the 
plaintiffs alleged that releasing products simultaneously rather than 
rushing to release next generation products before its competitor was 
contrary to both expectations in a competitive technology market 
and prior practice.200 Both defendants also were the subjects of a 
criminal investigation conducted by the Antitrust Division of the 
Justice Department.201 
Despite an agreement being obviously plausible in a literal sense, 
the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.202 The court 
said that the “Plaintiffs’ allegations of parallel conduct could possibly 
be indicative of a conspiracy, but [fell] short of unusual, lockstep 
pricing behavior.”203 The court found that there were innocent 
explanations for the defendants’ parallel conduct: price similarity of 
similar products was to be expected, and the timing of release of new 
products may have been dictated by the original equipment maker’s 
(the buyers of the defendants’ products) product cycle.204 
Alternatively, the court reasoned, a competitor might delay a 
product release to maximize revenue on older products, “with the 
delay lasting until [its] hands are forced by the competition.”205 The 
court also thought the defendants’ behavior could be the result of 
conscious parallelism, which the court said was legal.206 The court, 
relying on a summary judgment case, said that the opportunities to 
agree at the plethora of industry meetings attended by both 
 
 199. Id. at 1014–18. 
 200. Id. at 1014, 1017. 
 201. Id. at 1017–18. 
 202. The court left open the possibility of amendment if the plaintiffs could provide 
additional detail about prior practice to demonstrate “‘complex and historically unprecedented 
changes in pricing structure made at the very same time by multiple competitors, and made for 
no other discernible reason.’” Id. at 1019–20, 1024 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 
S. Ct. 1955, 1965 n.4 (2007)). The plaintiffs added allegations regarding defendants’ behavior 
before the alleged conspiracy began; pleaded more specific information regarding the 
economics of the GPU market and the timing of defendants’ product releases during the 
period that the conspiracy had allegedly occurred; and claimed that after defendants learned of 
the criminal investigation by the Antitrust Division, they started to release products at different 
times and at different prices. Id. at 1011. The court found the amended complaint sufficient to 
withstand a motion to dismiss. Id.  
 203. Id. at 1022. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 1023 (citing In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)).  
 206. Id. at 1023 n.6. The Court did not provide a citation for its statement that 
conscious parallelism is legal, but relied on a summary judgment case for its description of 
conscious parallelism as interdependent pricing in an oligopoly market. Id. 
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defendants were not a basis from which to infer conspiracy.207 
Finally, the Court dismissed the Justice Department investigation as 
meaningless, saying that the scope of the investigation was pure 
speculation and the Justice Department ultimately might decide not 
to prosecute.208 
The sole Court of Appeals decision to decide an oligopoly 
pricing case in the first six months post-Twombly, In re Elevator 
Antitrust Litigation,209 produced a similar result. In that case, 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to fix prices and 
eliminate competition in the global market for the sale and servicing 
of elevators beginning as early as 2000 and continuing to the 
present.210 The complaint asserted that the top four defendant sellers 
controlled approximately seventy-five percent of the elevator industry 
in the United States, an industry with high barriers to entry; the 
defendants’ executives had ample opportunity to meet at industry, 
trade association and social functions; and defendants issued standard 
price lists and contracts for maintenance and repairs of elevators, 
which included similar, if not identical, language and terms.211 Still, 
the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal without 
leave to amend.212 The court found the allegations of agreement too 
conclusory and viewed the similarities in contractual language, 
pricing, and equipment design, while consistent with conspiracy, as 
equally explainable as the result of legitimate conduct.213 The court 
reasoned: 
Similar contract terms can reflect similar bargaining power and 
commercial goals (not to mention boilerplate); similar contract 
language can reflect the copying of documents that may not be 
secret; similar pricing can suggest competition at least as plausibly 
as it can suggest anticompetitive conspiracy; and similar equipment 
design can reflect the state of the art.214 
 
 207. Id. at 1023 (citing In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d at 1098). 
 208. Id. at 1024. 
 209. 502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 210. Complaint, ¶¶ 41, 61, In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 2005 WL 3736019 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 19, 2005). 
 211. Id., ¶¶ 46–47, 49. 
 212. In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d at 47.  
 213. Id. at 50–51. 
 214. Id. at 51.  
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The court viewed the detailed collusion in Europe as carrying no 
weight absent more than conclusory allegations of a linkage between 
the foreign conduct and the United States market.215 
4. The flaws of the post-Twombly oligopoly pricing cases 
Whether or not these lower court decisions dismissing oligopoly 
pricing cases represent a reasonable interpretation of Twombly, they 
suffer from several common flaws that were made possible by 
Twombly’s lack of clarity: (1) these decisions apply summary 
judgment case law on a motion to dismiss; (2) the summary 
judgment standard they apply is an improper interpretation of 
Supreme Court precedent; and (3) they analyze individual 
allegations rather than the allegations as a whole. The consequence is 
not merely to insulate interdependent pricing, but to drastically 
diminish the ability of private attorney generals—civil case 
plaintiffs—to enforce the laws against actual price fixing. 
a. Reliance upon summary judgment case law. In re Travel Agent 
Commission Antitrust Litigation,216 In re Graphics Processing Units 
 
 215. Id. at 52. Two oligopoly pricing cases post-Twombly denied a motion to dismiss. In 
one, the complaint contained very specific allegations of communications between defendants 
to fix prices. See In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litig., 504 F. Supp. 2d 777, 790 (N.D. Cal. 
2007). However, in the other case the court found the complaint sufficient to withstand a 
motion to dismiss despite the defendants’ contention that their allegedly parallel conduct was 
“natural” given the market conditions. See In re OSB Antitrust Litig., No. 06-826, 2007 WL 
2253419, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2007). That decision might support the narrow reading of 
Twombly, that allegations of interdependent, as opposed to independent, conduct are sufficient 
to state a § 1 claim. The complaint contained many of the same allegations as in the above-
described cases. See supra notes 183–212 and accompanying text. The complaint alleged that 
the nine defendants together controlled ninety-five percent of the market; the market leader 
announced mill shutdowns to reduce capacity despite increasing demand; the remaining 
defendants followed suit; prices were fixed through the use of a twice-weekly published price 
list by an industry periodical; and the result of this conduct was mammoth increases in prices. 
In re OSB Antitrust, 2007 WL 2253419, at *3. Plaintiff also included conclusory allegations of 
price fixing and price fixing discussions at industry meetings and a description of prior price 
fixing by these defendants in a related industry. Id. at *5; In re OSB Antitrust Litig., No. 06-
CV-00826, 2006 WL 4025236, ¶ 103 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2006). Nonetheless, the complaint 
contained one additional allegation that seems to provide greater support for an inference of 
agreement. Plaintiffs alleged the defendants bought the product from competitors despite 
being able to manufacture it themselves at lower cost. See In re OSB Antitrust, 2007 WL 
2253419, at *3. Purchases from competitors, combined with the parallel reductions in 
capacity, are suspicious, see, e.g., In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 504 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 
(E.D. Pa. 2007), and provide a level of cooperation that supports a pre-existing understanding, 
if not a formal agreement.  
 216. No. 1:03-CV-3000, 2007 WL 3171675 (N.D. Ohio 2007). 
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Antitrust Litigation,217 and In re Elevator Antitrust Litigation218 rely 
on summary judgment case law to dismiss the significance of 
opportunities to agree or a prior history of collusion. Moreover, they 
appear to require allegations that tend to exclude the possibility of 
independent action,219 which is the standard the Supreme Court 
established for summary judgment in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite 
Service Corp.220 and Matsushita Electric Industrial Corp. v. Zenith 
Radio, Corp.221 The courts err by assuming that the standard for a 
motion to dismiss is, or should be, the same as the standard for a 
summary judgment. That assumption is contrary to the purposes of 
pleadings, discovery and summary judgment, Supreme Court 
precedent, and sound policy. 
A primary purpose of discovery is to develop information. 
Accordingly, to demand the same level of facts pre- and post- 
discovery makes no sense. This is especially true in price fixing cases. 
Agreements to fix prices are per se illegal and, therefore, evidence of 
agreement is not likely to be public. The Court, specifically 
recognizing this asymmetry of information, has said, “dismissals prior 
to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should be 
granted very sparingly.”222 
Unlike on summary judgment, if an oligopoly pricing case is 
prematurely dismissed, the error cost may not be merely allowing 
interdependence or unproven collusion to go uncontested, but 
permitting explicit price fixing that could be proven to go 
unpunished. On summary judgment, evidence of a prior history of 
collusion merely suggests that if the defendants reached agreement 
before, they may have done it again. No reasonable jury could find 
for the plaintiff on such evidence. At the pleading stage, in oligopoly 
pricing cases, the same suggestion makes agreement “plausible” and, 
 
 217. 527 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (N.D. Cal 2007). 
 218. 502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 219. See id. at 50–51; In re Travel Agent Comm’n, 2007 WL 3171675, at *11; In re 
Graphics Processing Units, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.  
 220. 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
 221. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 222. Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976) (quoting Poller v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962)).  
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given the information asymmetry, creates a “reasonably founded 
hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant information.”223 
Under the federal rules, the purpose of the pleadings is to 
provide notice.224 Summary judgment is designed to eliminate claims 
lacking merit.225 Indeed, the Court has suggested that a more 
rigorous summary judgment standard is appropriate, given the liberal 
notice pleading rules.226 By implication, this means that the two 
standards cannot be the same. The Court has held as much, albeit in 
the Title VII context.227 
The error costs of a false positive in antitrust cases also 
recommend application of different standards. If a motion to dismiss 
is mistakenly denied, the defendant faces only the costs of discovery, 
and perhaps not even that. It is possible that a 12(e) motion for a 
more definite statement can make evident the complaint’s lack of 
merit,228 or that the defendant can submit affidavits or other 
documents to obtain an early summary judgment.229 If a motion for 
summary judgment is wrongly denied, the defendant faces the costs 
of trial and a possible judgment for treble damages and attorneys’ 
fees.230 
b. The improper summary judgment standard. The lower courts 
that apply a summary judgment standard on a motion to dismiss 
compound their error by misapplying the Supreme Court’s standard. 
The two Supreme Court decisions that developed the summary 
judgment standard for agreement in antitrust cases are Monsanto Co. 
v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.231 and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp.232 
 (1) The Supreme Court cases. In Monsanto,233 a discounting 
distributor brought suit against a manufacturer for terminating its 
 
 223. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007). The same can be said 
about opportunities to agree.  
 224. Id. at 1964 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002).  
 225. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514.  
 226. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).  
 227. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 506.  
 228. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e), 56.  
 229. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 230. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2008). 
 231. 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
 232. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 233. 465 U.S. 752. 
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distributorship. The plaintiff alleged that its termination, following 
complaints from rival distributors about the plaintiff’s price-cutting, 
constituted a conspiracy to fix resale prices in violation of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act.234 The court of appeals affirmed a jury decision for the 
plaintiff, finding that “proof of termination following competitor 
complaints is sufficient to support an inference of concerted 
action.”235 Although affirming the judgment, the Supreme Court 
rejected this standard of proof.236 The Court agreed with the 
petitioner manufacturer that complaints about price-cutters are 
“natural” and “unavoidable.”237 Therefore, to permit the inference 
of concerted action based upon such complaints alone would rob the 
manufacturer of its right to choose with whom to deal and would 
unfairly subject it to treble damage liability for exercise of its 
independent business judgment.238 The Court instead held that to 
submit a case to a jury in distributor-termination litigation “there 
must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the 
manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting 
independently.”239 
This language was repeated in Matsushita.240 In that case, 
American manufacturers of television sets sued their Japanese 
counterparts. They alleged that twenty-one Japanese manufacturers 
conspired to fix low predatory prices in the United States and 
subsidized those prices by fixing high prices on sets sold in Japan.241 
The Court began by eliminating the possibility of recovery for 
cartelization of the Japanese market, recognizing that American 
antitrust laws do not regulate competitive conditions in foreign 
economies.242 Thus, the issue for the Court became whether the 
 
 234. Id. at 757–59. The plaintiff also alleged that the manufacturer’s adoption of 
compensation programs and shipping policies and encouragement of distributors to boycott 
the plaintiff were in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Id. at 757. 
 235. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1238 (1982), aff’d, 465 
U.S. 752 (1984). 
 236. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 759. 
 237. Id. at 763. 
 238. Id. at 761–64. 
 239. Id. at 764. 
 240. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 241. Id. at 578. 
 242. Id. at 582 (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 
(2d Cir. 1945)); I PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS 
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 236d (1978)). 
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plaintiffs submitted sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to predatory 
price in the United States to submit the case to the jury. The Court, 
citing Monsanto, stated that “antitrust law limits the range of 
permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a section 1  
case. . . . [C]onduct as consistent with permissible competition as 
with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference 
of antitrust conspiracy.”243 Rather “to survive a motion for summary 
judgment . . . a plaintiff . . . must present evidence ‘that tends to 
exclude the possibility’ that the alleged conspirators acted 
independently.”244 Given the implausibility of a two-decade 
predatory pricing conspiracy where “the prospects of attaining 
monopoly power” appeared slight,245 the Court concluded that the 
plaintiff’s evidence did not meet its burden.246 
 (2) Lower courts’ improper application of the “tends to 
exclude” language. The lower court decisions post-Twombly have 
found that allegations do not tend to exclude the possibility of 
independent action if conduct can be explained by independent 
business reasons. Thus, in In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust 
Litigation,247 the district court dismissed allegations that shortly after 
trade shows the defendants delayed the release of new products or 
released products at approximately the same time and price as 
explainable by OEM product cycles and specifications.248 Similarly, in 
In re Elevator Litigation,249 the district court viewed similarities in 
contractual language, pricing, and equipment design as explainable 
by similar bargaining power, copying of documents, competition, 
and the state of the art in design.250 Requiring dismissal when 
challenged business conduct can be explained by independent 
business reasons has support in some courts of appeals’ summary 
judgment decisions.251 Nonetheless, as explained below, those 
 
 243. Id. at 588 (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. 752). 
 244. Id. (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764). 
 245. Id. at 590. 
 246. Id. at 587–91. 
 247. 527 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (N.D. Ca. 2007). 
 248. Id. at 1021–23. 
 249. 502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 250. Id. at 51. 
 251. See In re Baby Food Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 127 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Citric Acid 
Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 1999). Some courts also will grant summary 
judgment when the inferences of agreement and interdependence are in equipoise. See 
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decisions are not a proper interpretation of summary judgment 
standards.252 Courts have repeatedly held that there is a “genuine” 
issue of fact precluding summary judgment if “the evidence is such 
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party.”253 To the extent a lower court’s summary judgment test 
requires a plaintiff to do more than present evidence showing a 
genuine issue of material fact,254 it is plainly inconsistent with Rule 
56. Moreover, in deciding whether a reasonable jury could decide 
for the nonmoving party, a court must view the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.255 Courts are specifically admonished not to 
“weigh the evidence” or try to “determine the truth of the 
matter.”256 Those courts granting summary judgment when 
circumstantial evidence is as consistent with conspiracy as with 
independent action257 violate these basic principles. To the extent 
courts require a plaintiff to exclude the possibility of independent 
conduct,258 those courts not only do not consider the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, but they stand the “reasonable 
jury” standard on its head. To survive summary judgment in those 
courts, a plaintiff must prove that all reasonable juries would decide 
 
Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003); Blomkest 
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp., 203 F.3d 1028, 1032 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 252. See infra notes 247–75 and accompanying text. See also In re High Fructose Corn 
Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655–56 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Coordinated Pretrial 
Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 253. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Rodgers v. 
Monumental Life Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 442, 448 (6th Cir. 2002); Logan v. Commercial Union 
Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 1996); MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 
1437, 1440 (10th Cir. 1996); Yerdon v. Henry, 91 F.3d 370, 374–75 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 254. See, e.g., In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d at 1094–95. 
 255. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Rodgers, 289 F.3d at 448; 
In re Baby Food Litig., 166 F.3d at 124; Logan, 96 F.3d at 978; MacDonald, 94 F.3d at 1440; 
Yerdon, 91 F.3d at 375; see also Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(“[W]hile some assessing of the evidence is necessary in order to determine rationally what 
inferences are reasonable and therefore permissible, it is evident that the question of what 
weight should be assigned to competing permissible inferences remains within the province of 
the fact-finder at a trial.”). 
 256. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 
 257. See, e.g., Williamson Oil Co. v. Phillip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1300–01 (11th 
Cir. 2003); Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1032 (8th Cir. 
2000); In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d at 1095 (discussing Richards v. Neilsen Freight 
Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 903–04 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 258. See, e.g., Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1300; Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1036; In re 
Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d at 1096; In re Baby Food Litig., 166 F.3d at 124. 
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in its favor or that the plaintiff itself is entitled to summary 
judgment. In effect, these courts take the issue of agreement, a fact 
question for the jury, and turn it into a question of law. 
 (3) Monsanto and Matsushita properly understood. Rather 
than follow, as opposed to merely give lip service to,259 the 
traditional summary judgment principles, lower courts rejecting 
oligopoly pricing cases rely upon statements from Monsanto260 and 
Matsushita.261 Understood in context, however, these two cases do 
not support those courts’ position. 
The Court in Monsanto recognized that in virtually every case in 
which a discounting distributor is terminated complaints from 
competing distributors would have preceded the termination.262 
Therefore, proof of termination following complaints had no 
tendency to prove that the termination was the result of conspiracy. 
Moreover, to allow a jury to find agreement based upon termination 
following complaints alone would rob the manufacturer of its right 
to independently choose to terminate a distributor with which it was 
unhappy.263 Given that a manufacturer may have a pro-competitive 
reason to terminate a distributor in a vertical restraint case such as 
Monsanto, the Court demanded that a plaintiff’s evidence “tend[] to 
exclude the possibility . . . [of] acting independently,” that is, have 
some tendency to distinguish independent action from conspiracy.264 
Accordingly, the case stands for nothing more than the proposition 
that evidence that will exist in every case, whether or not there is 
agreement, cannot support an inference of agreement, especially 
when the effect of such an inference would be to discourage 
potentially beneficial conduct. 
The mistake lower courts and several commentators265 make is to 
require evidence that has more than a “tendency” to exclude 
 
 259. See, e.g., In re Baby Food Litig., 166 F.3d at 124. It is not uncommon for courts to 
recite summary judgment principles in “catechistic” fashion and then ignore them. See Arthur 
Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and 
Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
982, 1092 (2003). 
 260. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
 261. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 262. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763. 
 263. See id. at 764. 
 264. Id. 
 265. See, e.g., Roger Blair & Jill Herndon, Inferring Collusion from Economic Evidence, 
15 ANTITRUST 17, 19 (Summer 2001); David Meyer, The Seventh Circuit’s High Fructose Corn 
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independent conduct. By requiring plaintiffs to negate defendants’ 
independent business justifications,266 the courts read the “tends to” 
requirement out of Monsanto’s often-quoted instruction. This not 
only ignores the rule against weighing evidence on a motion for 
summary judgment,267 but effectively limits plaintiffs to proving 
agreement solely based on direct evidence.268 Circumstantial 
evidence, by definition, allows for more than one possible 
inference.269 
Matsushita also cannot support the decisions dismissing 
oligopoly cases whenever there is a rational justification for the 
defendants’ conduct. In Matsushita, the Court was reluctant to find 
agreement based on ambiguous evidence for two reasons: (1) the 
Court found the allegations of a conspiracy to engage in predatory 
pricing for more than two decades highly implausible270 and 
therefore imposed a higher burden of proof upon the plaintiff;271 and 
(2) the Court believed that an improper finding of illegality would 
discourage competitive pricing—just the type of behavior that the 
antitrust laws were designed to further.272 As an allegation of price 
fixing in an oligopoly is almost always plausible and an erroneous 
finding of illegality generally would not discourage pro-competitive 
conduct, Matsushita does not require that there be a heavy burden 
of proof on plaintiffs trying to avoid summary judgment in oligopoly 
pricing cases. Indeed, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Services, Inc.,273 the Court specified that Matsushita “did not 
 
Syrup Decision—Sweet for Plaintiffs, Sticky for Defendants, 17 ANTITRUST 67, 69–72 (Fall 
2002). 
 266. See supra notes 247–58 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
 268. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litig., 
906 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that “such an interpretation of Matsushita would 
seem to be tantamount to requiring direct evidence of conspiracy”). 
 269. See id.; see also Daniel P. Collins, Note, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial 
Evidence, 40 STAN. L. REV. 491, 500 n.53 (1988). 
 270. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588–92 (1986). 
The Court noted that there was “a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing 
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.” Id. at 589. Given that consensus, the 
Court concluded that plaintiffs’ allegations that twenty-one defendants would agree to sell 
products below cost for over two decades, without any guarantee of capturing market share or 
likelihood of recouping losses, were spurious. See id. at 597–98. 
 271. Id. at 587. 
 272. Id. at 593–94. 
 273. 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
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introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing summary judgment in 
antitrust cases” or entitle a defendant to summary judgment 
whenever it “enunciates [an] economic theory supporting its 
behavior.”274 Rather, “Matsushita demand[ed] only that the 
nonmoving party’s inferences be reasonable in order to reach the 
jury. . . . If the plaintiff’s theory is economically senseless, no 
reasonable jury could find in its favor. . . .”275 Obviously, if 
Matsushita and Monsanto don’t support entry of summary judgment 
when the defendant can provide an innocent explanation for its 
behavior, they definitely do not mandate dismissal on a 12(b)(6) 
motion. 
 (4) Policy benefits of the “reasonable jury” standard in 
oligopoly pricing cases. The benefits of applying the “reasonable 
jury” standard to determine if the issue of agreement should be 
submitted to a jury are not limited to consistency with traditional 
summary judgment principles and the proper interpretation of 
Monsanto and Matsushita. Rather, the reasonable jury standard will 
eliminate some of the worst types of violations. In price fixing cases, 
to avoid per se treatment, the defendants will either try to justify 
their behavior as pro-competitive or deny that there was an 
agreement to fix prices. As a practical matter, it is difficult to argue 
both credibly. Thus, in cases where agreement is the issue, the 
conduct involved generally can be presumed unjustifiable and 
unambiguously anti-competitive. Under-deterrence in such cases, as 
exists under the improper summary judgment standard, carries an 
 
 274. Id. at 468. 
 275. Id. at 468–69; see also In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products 
Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Nor do we think that Matsushita and 
Monsanto can be read as authorizing a court to award summary judgment to antitrust 
defendants whenever the evidence is plausibly consistent with both inferences of conspiracy 
and inferences of innocent conduct. . . . [S]uch an interpretation of Matsushita would seem to 
be tantamount to requiring direct evidence of conspiracy. This cannot be what the Court 
meant in Matsushita. Since direct evidence will rarely be available, such a reading would 
seriously undercut the effectiveness of the antitrust laws.”). Matsushita, however, does explain 
why a lenient attitude toward submission of plaintiffs’ evidence to the jury in oligopoly pricing 
cases should not significantly affect the finding of agreement in non-oligopoly markets. 
Matsushita teaches that the less plausible the allegations of conspiracy, the more evidence 
required for submission of the case to a jury. The “implausibility of a scheme [also] will reduce 
the range of inferences that may permissibly be drawn from ambiguous evidence.” Apex Oil 
Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 1987). If the market is not conducive to 
collusion or appears to be performing competitively, as will often be the case in non-oligopoly 
markets, more will be required of the plaintiff before the case is submitted to the jury. 
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especially harmful error cost. To the extent courts apply a more 
lenient standard for submission of an oligopoly pricing case to the 
jury, oligopolists also will be more reluctant to enter into price fixing 
agreements in the first place. Thus, price fixing in cases in which no 
evidence of agreement would be found, also can be deterred. 
Admittedly, the more lenient “reasonable jury” standard will 
have its own error costs. Some juries will find the defendants guilty 
of conspiracy when, in fact, they only acted interdependently. There 
also will be the costs of trial in those cases which would not survive 
summary judgment under the majority approach but do not result in 
any finding of liability. Nonetheless, these costs are not significant. 
If, as suggested earlier,276 interdependence is legal not because it is 
desirable, but merely because remedy is not feasible, the former error 
cost is not a cost at all, but a benefit. In this context, remedy is 
definable. Damages can be assessed for the overcharge (measured as 
in any other price fixing case) and defendants can be instructed 
either not to have excessive prices277 or to refrain from the additional 
conduct that formed the basis of a finding of agreement.278 The cost 
of trials that do not result in liability probably should not be 
considered an error cost of the proper summary judgment standard 
as much as an expense of having a right to trial by jury.279 After all, 
this cost could be completely avoided if every case were decided by 
the judge on summary judgment. In any event, given the uncertainty 
of trial and the fact that damages are based upon the amount of the 
overcharge, plaintiffs most likely will bring price fixing claims only 
when prices are substantially supra-competitive. In such cases, a jury 
is more likely to find liability, and even if they do not, the costs of 
trial would be an additional deterrent to oligopolists who desire to 
adopt truly excessive prices.280 In short, even if courts were to apply 
 
 276. See supra note 164. 
 277. Unless prices were clearly excessive, plaintiffs are unlikely to sue given the costs of 
suit, the uncertainty of prevailing, and minimal possible damages. Thus, defendants would not 
face the twin risks of predatory pricing liability or violating a court injunction as under Judge 
Posner’s proposal to find all tacit agreement illegal. See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying 
text. 
 278. If the conduct that gave rise to the finding of agreement is pro-competitive, a higher 
burden should be placed on the plaintiff to convince a court that a reasonable jury could find a 
conspiracy to fix prices. See supra text accompanying notes 263, 272. 
 279. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also Miller, supra note 259, at 1092–93. 
 280. One potential problem with the liberal application of the “reasonable jury” standard 
is that some courts might allow cases to go to the jury in non-oligopoly pricing cases based 
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the same standard on motions to dismiss as on summary judgment, 
the proper standard would be the reasonable jury standard. Plaintiffs 
should not be required to exclude all innocent explanations for the 
defendants’ conduct. 
c. Compartmentalizing allegations. If applying summary 
judgment standards on a motion to dismiss and following those 
courts that apply the wrong summary judgment standard was not 
error enough, lower courts dismissing oligopoly cases for failure to 
state a claim make the plaintiff’s burden nearly impossible by 
evaluating the plaintiff’s allegations individually, rather than as a 
whole. Absent direct evidence of agreement, the smoking-gun-of-
illegal-conspiracy, a single piece of evidence is unlikely to support a 
finding of agreement by itself. “Thus it is essential to consider all of 
the evidence proffered to determine whether it is sufficient to 
withstand a motion [to dismiss.]”281 As Judge Posner stated in the 
context of summary judgment motions: 
[One] trap to be avoided . . . is to suppose that if no single item of 
evidence presented by the plaintiff points unequivocally to 
conspiracy, the evidence as a whole cannot defeat summary 
judgment. It is true that zero plus zero equals zero. But evidence 
can be susceptible of different interpretations, only one of which 
supports the party sponsoring it, without being wholly devoid of 
probative value for that party. Otherwise [there would never be a] 
need . . . for a trial.”282  
 For example, an identification is not very good if it is solely based 
on the perpetrator being six feet tall. Too many people are six feet 
tall. Similarly, it is not a very good identification to identify a suspect 
based solely on the perpetrator weighing over 300 pounds, or having 
red hair, or wearing glasses, or having a mustache. Yet an 
identification based on the combination of all these factors is a fairly 
 
upon the same threshold of evidence as found sufficient in oligopoly pricing cases. This could 
result in erroneous findings of liability when the defendants’ conduct was truly independent 
(not just interdependent). That would be a very real cost. However, that possibility is not an 
error cost of using the proper standard as much as an error cost of improper interpretation of 
Supreme Court precedent. As suggested earlier, in non-oligopoly markets and markets 
performing competitively, courts, following the teachings of Matsushita, should impose upon 
plaintiffs a much heavier burden of proof to establish that a reasonable jury could find 
agreement. See supra note 275. 
 281. See Cosmetic Gallery, Inc. v. Schoeneman Corp., 495 F.3d 46, 52 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 282. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
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good identification. It is precisely for this reason the Supreme Court 
has admonished that “plaintiffs should be given the full benefit of 
their proof without tightly compartmentalizing the various factual 
components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each.”283 The 
lower courts dismissing oligopoly pricing cases have failed to heed 
this advice. 
5. The consequences of the lower courts’ interpretation of Twombly 
Given the lower courts’ application of Twombly, few private 
plaintiffs are going to survive a motion to dismiss in cases alleging 
price fixing in oligopoly markets, unless they are riding on the 
coattails of a prior government antitrust suit. Direct evidence of 
agreement is unlikely to be available pre-discovery. Circumstantial 
evidence, by definition, generally will have some innocent 
explanation. This is not to say agreement can never be proved. 
Evidence of reducing output and buying from competitors,284 
submitting identical sealed bids,285 or engaging in sudden and 
simultaneous complex action unexplained by external events286 can 
support a finding of agreement. However, few competitors are likely 
to be foolish enough to engage in such “smoking gun” conduct.287 
Thus, the lower court cases dismissing oligopoly pricing cases 
effectively insulate price fixing agreements, not merely 
interdependent conduct, from private enforcement.288 
Eliminating private suits alleging price fixing in oligopoly 
markets may have been the Twombly Court’s intent. The Court has 
 
 283. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 
(1962). 
 284. See In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig, 504 F. Supp.2d 38 (E.D. Pa. 2007); In re OSB 
Antitrust Litig., No. 06-826, 2007 WL 2253419 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2007). 
 285. See VI AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 142, ¶ 1425a, at 168. 
 286. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 n.4 (2007); VI AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 142, ¶ 1425c, at 170. 
 287. The other bases for finding an agreement suggested by the sources cited by the 
Supreme Court, Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 n.4, such as furnishing competitors detailed 
information about one’s operations or letters explaining a price cut, see Blechman, supra note 
172, at 899, are likely to require access to the defendants’ files. 
 288. In non-oligopoly markets, markets with too many competitors to explain non-
competitive behavior as the result of interdependence, agreement should be easier to prove. In 
those markets, conduct against the defendants’ self-interest will distinguish agreement from 
independent conduct. 
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been restricting enforcement of the antitrust laws generally289 and 
may have reasoned that government suits remedy the majority of 
price fixing cases. Given government enforcement, the Court may 
have concluded that the error costs of a dismissal cannot outweigh 
the discovery expenses of a wrongful continuation of litigation. 
Although government resources are limited, the government is likely 
to target the worst violations. Thus, it is impossible to say that the 
Court’s balance of costs and benefits is wrong. However, such 
reasoning clearly would be inconsistent with congressional intent to 
encourage private antitrust enforcement.290 There also is no excuse 
for the Court’s inability to support its decision with clear reasoning.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite the confusing and muddled opinion in Twombly, it has 
not greatly affected pleading practice outside the oligopoly pricing 
context. Pleading requirements in routine cases appear to be 
completely unchanged. In complex cases, lower court judges have an 
increased discretion to demand additional facts. However, they 
generally have exercised that discretion reasonably by considering the 
complexity of the case, the availability of an early summary 
judgment, the ability of the court to structure pre-trial proceedings, 
the accessibility of more facts before discovery, and the plausibility of 
the plaintiff’s claim. 
The Court’s lack of clarity, however, has contributed to 
problematic decisionmaking by lower courts in oligopoly pricing 
cases. Courts have applied summary judgment standards to the 
motion to dismiss, have followed case law for summary judgment 
standards that misconstrues Supreme Court precedent and is 
inconsistent with the Federal Rules and sound policy, and have 
improperly compartmentalized plaintiffs’ allegations. The result has 
been to make private suits for price fixing in oligopoly markets 
 
 289. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) 
(resale price maintenance); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 
S. Ct. 1069 (2007) (predatory bidding); Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, 
Inc. 546 U.S. 164 (2006) (price discrimination). 
 290. See Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957) (“Congress itself 
has placed the private antitrust litigant in a most favorable position. . . . In the face of such a 
policy this Court should not add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is 
specifically set forth by Congress in those laws.”); accord Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 
U.S. 465, 472 (1982). 
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virtually unwinnable. This result, although not clearly inconsistent 
with Twombly, is not compelled by it.291 
Oligopoly pricing costs consumers billions of dollars and results 
in significant misallocation of resources.292 The government cannot 
pursue every potential defendant and reliance on it to do so is plainly 
inconsistent with Congressional intent to create private attorneys 
general.293 It is far better to view the lower courts’ interpretation of 
Twombly as improper and to limit Twombly to situations where the 
plaintiffs’ allegations are literally implausible. It would have been 
better still if the Supreme Court made this intention clear in 
Twombly. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will correct the lower 
courts’ errors in the near future.  
 
 291. See supra notes 265–90 and accompanying text. 
 292. Fines for prosecution of cases involving the vitamin industry alone exceeded $850 
million. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2004). Private civil 
settlements exceeded an additional billion dollars. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Class Action, 
No. 99-197, 1999 WL 1335318, at *1 (D.D.C. 1999).  
 293. See supra note 290. 
